

COMMENTS ON PROF. J MARK RAMSEYER'S ARTICLE 'SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE PROBLEM OF OPPORTUNISTIC LEADERSHIP: THE EXAMPLE OF KOREANS IN JAPAN' (PUBLISHED ONLINE BY THE *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS* ON 18 FEBRUARY 2021, CURRENTLY BEING RE-EXAMINED BY THE JOURNAL)

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GENERAL COMMENTS –

In the comments below, I argue that this article's 'case study' dealing with Koreans in Japan is both factually wrong and falls woefully below standards of research integrity expected of a peer reviewed article in the following ways:

- a. Instead of seriously addressing existing research, and explaining why the author rejects the views of the vast majority of experts in the field, it simply ignores the content and findings of this research, and cherry-picks it for snippets of convenient information which are used in a misleading way (for example – Section 4.4, comment 5).
- b. It uncritically uses unscholarly and notoriously unreliable sources such as anonymous blogs, Wikipedia, popular books by far-right agitators etc. In some cases, unchecked use of facts from these sources results in fundamental factual errors (for example – 5.1.1, comment 2; 5.2.2, comment 3).
- c. It misquotes sources in a way that indicates, at least, a degree of carelessness unacceptable in a peer-reviewed article (for example – 4.4, comment 2)
- d. It makes important assertions of fact without providing any verifiable evidence or references (for example, 5.2.2, comment 1; 5.2.2, comment 3).
- e. It uses demeaning and offensive language about the subjects of the research (for example, 4.4, comment 1; 5.2.2, comment 3).

The article ignores the analysis and findings of almost all existing scholarship on the topic of Koreans in Japan for all periods discussed. It makes no reference to key works on the subject in English and Japanese, such as Kim (1997), Ōnuma (2005); Chapman (2007); Lie (2008); Oguma and Kang (2008); Ryang and Lie (2009); Kim-Wachuka (2018) etc.

It is inadequate in terms of contextualisation – it provides no proper background information about Japanese colonial policy in Korea, the division of the Korean Peninsula, the Korean War etc., all of which are essential to understanding the topics it discusses. One of the most glaring flaws is its failure to provide any definition of 'Koreans in Japan'. This results in multiple examples of misleading statements and misleading data.

'Koreans in Japan' can refer to any or all of the following groups –

- (i) Koreans who arrived in Japan before Korea regained its independence, and were legally Japanese when they arrived, but whose Japanese nationality was unilaterally abrogated by the Japanese state in 1952 (and those descendants of the group who are still Korean nationals). In government reports, members of this group are often referred to by the term which indicates their current legal status in Japan: 'special permanent residents';

- (ii) Koreans from group (i) who have become Japanese nationals by naturalisation or birth (with one Japanese parent or grandparent), but retain a sense of Korean identity;
- (iii) More recent migrants from Korea to Japan ('newcomers').

In my comments below, I refer to the people in groups (i) and (ii) as 'Zainichi Koreans', a term widely used in Japan and internationally. Ramseyer's article slides from one category to another in a confusing and misleading way. I shall return to this issue later in my comments.

## SECTION 4.2 PREWAR IMMIGRATION

### 4.2.1-4.2.2

1. Ramseyer gives figures showing the growing population of Koreans in Japan as rising from about 130,000 in 1925 to 1.2 million in 1940 and over 2.2 million by 1945. He writes 'Koreans moved to Japan for the money'. In a footnote and with no details, he briefly mentions both a 'restrictive recruiting effort' by Japan to encourage Koreans to work in Japan – adding (with absolutely no supporting reference or evidence) that a 'substantial minority of Koreans who applied for the jobs were not hired' – and a subsequent draft of Korean workers that started in the fall of 1944. What he is discreetly alluding to here is the fact that around one-third of the Koreans in Japan at the end of the Asia-Pacific War – at least 700,000 people – were there because they had been recruited as wartime labourers by the Japanese state, by means which included threats, deception or violence (See, for example, Nishinarita 2000, p. 398; Naitou 2005).
2. Ramseyer depicts Koreans in Japan *en masse* as poor and unskilled young men seeking 'money'. While a high proportion of prewar Korean migrants to Japan were from relatively poor rural backgrounds, this sweeping generalization neglects the fact that there were also others, including Koreans coming to Japan for college education (as indicated by Ramseyer's own later reference to the 1000 to 3000 Korean students in Tokyo at the time of the 1923 earthquake).
3. Ramseyer states that the Korean migrants to Japan brought only negative characteristics with them: lack of education, illiteracy, high crime rates, lack of 'steady effort' and work efficiency, and habits that Japanese landlords considered 'unsanitary'. These 'lacks' are used to justify the fact that Japanese employers and landlords shunned Koreans in favour of Japanese workers and tenants. Employers, Ramseyer argues, would of course have preferred Japanese workers who came from a more skilled, educated and industrially disciplined background. Aside from the fact that this echoes historical and contemporary prejudice and stereotypes, it is historically and logically flawed. Male Korean migrants seeking low-skilled work in Japanese cities were not competing against high-skilled and experienced Japanese industrial workers. They were competing against a mass of young Japanese men and women from poor farm families like their own, with a similar lack of experience in the disciplines of industrial labour, who were flowing into Japanese cities at the same time. And the Koreans were systematically being paid lower wages. Ramseyer's 'efficiency' rationale for the fact that 'Japanese employers avoided Koreans when they could' makes no sense.

### 4.2.3 What Koreans Did

1. According to Ramseyer's account, the only thing that 'Koreans did' was commit crimes and cause social disruption. His only sources for this section are official materials produced by the Japanese authorities of the day (including colonial Japanese authorities in Korea), and 'Miki 1933' (on which, see below).
2. Using these sources, Ramseyer states that arrest rates of Koreans for all crimes and for serious crimes were many times higher than those for Japanese. Setting aside the fact that Koreans were more likely to be arrested because they were targets of suspicion by the Japanese police, this ignores the obvious point highlighted by Japanese scholarship on the subject, and indeed by Ramseyer's own descriptions of the social make-up of the Korean population: the prewar comparisons between Japanese and Korean crime rates, cited by Ramseyer, fail to factor in age, class and gender. If the crime rates of young, male Japanese of lower socio-economic status in the prewar period are compared with those recorded for the same cohort of Koreans in Japan in the same period, the difference in crime rates is negligible (Ueda 2005, 9).

### 4.2.4 Terrorism

1. In this section, Ramseyer does not refer to any postwar scholarship in any language about the 1919 independence demonstrations in Korea and their aftermath – an aftermath which included mass killings, mass arrests and widespread torture by the Japanese colonial authorities – nor does he refer to any contemporary eyewitness testimony about the Japanese suppression of the independence movement by Koreans or by foreigners. (There is substantial English and other foreign language eyewitness testimony on this, particularly from European missionaries in Korea at the time).
2. Ramseyer conflates the complex Korean independence movements post 1 March 1919 with 'terrorism', failing even to mention that large sections of the movement were driven by liberal, Christian or other ideologies (see, for example, Park 2014).
3. His only sources on 'terrorism' are contemporary Japanese official documents and 'Miki 1933', which is also his major source for information Koreans' 'high crime rates' and on the 1923 massacres of Koreans. 'Miki 1933' is a report written by Miki Imaji, a Japanese state prosecutor of 'thought crimes', whose main task was to prosecute Koreans seen as dangerous by the state – a task which he performed with great zeal (see, for example, Kawashima 2009, 249, note 58). Because of his prewar activities, Miki was purged from public office during the Allied occupation.

## SECTION 4.4 – THE EARTHQUAKE

1. The main purpose of this section seems to be to repeat rumours about violent deeds or conspiracies by Koreans which circulated in Japan at the time of the massacres. The sources that Ramseyer draws on here are contemporary Japanese newspapers and documents produced by the Japanese police, colonial government etc., and again 'Miki 1933' (see above).

2. Anyone reading this very peculiar account of the 1923 massacre of Koreans would be forgiven for assuming, from the framing of the discussion, that many non-Japanese scholars vastly exaggerate the number of Koreans killed in the massacre, and that Ramseyer is setting the record straight. Perhaps he has confused the 1923 massacre with the 1937-38 Nanjing Massacre. In the latter case, there is a lot of controversy about the numbers killed. In the former, there isn't. Ramseyer adds nothing to our knowledge of the number of victims of the massacre. There is wide consensus that the number is unknown and unknowable, but may have been around 5000 to 6000 people. Since Ramseyer concedes that the number could have been up to 5200, this is hardly a ground-breaking revision. Ramseyer creates a straw scholar to demolish by citing Professor Sonia Ryang as claiming that 'the Japanese patrols may have killed 10,000... Elsewhere, she suggests 20,000.' (footnote 8). The 10,000 figure is sourced to an article where Ryang quotes this as a figure suggested by 'Japanese conscientious attorneys', without specifically endorsing it (Ryang 2003, p. 746). The 20,000 figure is sourced to a later article (readily accessible online - <https://apjff.org/-Sonia-Ryang/2513/article.html>) where Ryang gives the following estimate of massacre deaths: 'While the number can never be specified precisely' many sources agree that 'approximately *six thousand of the 20,000 Koreans residing in the Kanto area* were killed' (sic, my italics).
3. Ramseyer himself gives an estimate of a minimum of 400 killed (a number admitted by the prewar Japanese state) and a maximum of 5200, yet titles this section of his article 'Japanese Massacres?' with a question mark, implying that there is some doubt as to whether a massacre actually happened. This subtitle is never explained – does the question-mark mean that the killing of 'just' 400 people would not really qualify as a massacre?
4. Ramseyer selectively extracts convenient and uncontextualized snippets of information from one postwar collection of documents on the massacre, but makes no reference to any research findings contained any of the numerous scholarly works on the issue except for an article by Yamada Shōji (see below). He merely includes a footnote which lists a number of English works only to dismiss them on the grounds that they 'generally discount the reports of Korean violence, but take the newspaper accounts of retaliatory Japanese violence nearly at face value'. Of the works cited there, two are the works by Sonia Ryang (see above), and one (Bates 2006) has no reference at all to the 1923 massacre in the location cited.
5. Ramseyer's only postwar academic source for his discussion of the earthquake is Yamada Shōji's 2012/2013 article 'What Happened in the Area of Greater Tokyo Right after the Great Kantō Earthquake' (available online here - <http://www.cgs.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publication.html>). Ramseyer describes Yamada as having 'done some of the most careful work on the topic', but the only thing he cites from Yamada are a few statistics about the numbers of Koreans living in the Kanto district. He makes no mention of the fact that the key points of Yamada careful (and meticulously sourced) essay are as follows: various Japanese state agencies including the police were alarmed by the growing presence of Koreans in and around the capital, and deliberately provoked the massacre by disseminating fabricated rumours about Korean crimes or conspiracies (e.g. Yamada pp. 8-9); police then turned a blind eye to, or assisted, massacres by mobs or vigilante groups (Yamada pp. 13-14); Japanese military units not only helped to spread the rumours but also participated in the

massacres – Yamada lists fourteen such incidents, including one where soldiers used machine guns to ‘massacre Koreans in large numbers’ (Yamada pp. 10-11); the massacres were accompanied by widespread sexual abuse of Korean women (Yamada p. 15); the military and others concealed the extent of the killings by burying or burning bodies (Yamada pp. 11 and 15); the Japanese state covered up its own involvement in the massacres by prosecuting some private vigilantes while allowing soldiers and police involved in the massacre to avoid punishment (Yamada, pp. 17-18); the Japanese state should apologize for the massacres (Yamada, p. 1). Ramseyer’s use of this source is thus extremely misleading.

6. Ramseyer seeks to argue that the higher ‘possible’ figure of massacre deaths – over 5000 – is very unlikely given the number of Koreans living in and around Tokyo, and given the fact that some 7000 Koreans were placed in ‘protective custody’ by the police. This ignores the fact that some of those massacred had been placed in ‘protective custody’ only to be handed over by their ‘protectors’ to the mob to be killed (Yamada, p. 14)

## 5 WAR AND POSTWAR

This section demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics of the Korean community in postwar Japan, which is perhaps not surprising, as it cites none of the main scholarly works on the subject.

### 5.1.1 Politically Selected Immigration

1. The discussion here presents a extremely confused and confusing picture of the formation of the postwar Korean community in Japan. Ramseyer does not provide any estimates of the total number of Koreans who remained in Japan after the war, but seems to want to convey the sense that those who remained (or arrived as immigrants) were mostly communist. He tells us that there were about 1.9 million Koreans in Japan at the end of the war, and in a later (section 5.2.1) explains that ‘after 1945 (sic), the fiercely anti-communist Syngman Rhee gave the cross-cutting repatriation patterns a distinctly ideological cast. Disproportionately, conservative or apolitical Koreans returned to (or stayed in) South Korea’, suggesting that those who repatriated to Korea after the war were mostly people relatively sympathetic to the conservative Syngman Rhee regime, while those who remained were mostly left-wing. It is only possible for Ramseyer to make this muddled and misleading assertion because he fails to provide any figures of, or timeline for, the postwar repatriation Koreans. About 1.3 million Koreans were repatriated to Korea between August 1945 and early 1946, leaving around 500,000-600,000 Koreans in Japan (Kim 2015, 273) – a number which (as Ramseyer’s own figures show) remained roughly constant until the end of the twentieth century. In the period when the repatriation was taking place, politics in the southern half of Korea were in a state of flux and confusion. Syngman Rhee did not come to power until over two years later, in July 1948, so his policies obviously did not influence the decisions of those who repatriated or remained in Japan in 1945-1946. A large proportion the Koreans who were repatriated between August 1945 and early 1946 took part in the official repatriation program organized by the allied authorities, but this program required returnees to

leave most of their assets in Japan (see Augustine 2017), so more prosperous members of the Korean community had less incentive than others to return (a system which, it would be reasonable to hypothesize, selected returnees politically in the opposite sense to the sense suggested by Ramseyer).

2. Ramseyer then goes on to discuss the 1948 uprising and subsequent massacres on the Korean island of Jeju (commonly known as the Jeju 4.3 massacres), which, he claims, resulted in a flood of communist refugees entering Japan. Here, astonishingly, he writes: ‘estimates of the number it killed range from 15,000 to 60,000—*this on an island with a population of only 290,000*. Almost immediately, however, surviving Jeju leftists began to leave surreptitiously for Japan. Given that they migrated illegally, the number is hard to know. *But by 1957, barely 30,000 people still lived on the island*’ (my italics). In other words, he is suggesting that perhaps some 200,000 ‘leftist’ Jeju Islanders may have fled to Japan, leaving the island virtually depopulated. His source for these remarkable statistics is an anonymous online blog, much of whose contents (including Ramseyer’s figure of a remaining population of 30,000) come from Wikipedia. Wikipedia in turn attributes this to a dead link. In fact, the figure of 30,000 is clearly a misreading or distortion of a genuine estimate of the number of *victims of the massacre*. The official Korean report on the massacre, compiled in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, suggests this as a possible figure for number of those *killed in the massacres*, noting that *Jeju’s population fell from 282,942 in 1946 to 250,400 in 1949* (Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation/National Committee for Investigation of the Truth of the April 3 Incident 2003, 452). There are no accurate figures showing how many of these people were massacred, how many died from other causes and how many fled to Japan. However, if we accept that the roughly 32,500 decline in Jeju’s population between 1946 and 1949 represents both victims of the massacres and refugees fleeing to Japan, and that some further outflow of refugees continued into the early 1950s, a realistic estimate for the number heading for Japan would be in the thousands or low tens of thousands at the most. So, having spent much of the prewar section of the article trying to minimize the death figures for the 1923 massacre, which he (inaccurately) castigates other scholars for exaggerating, Ramseyer now casually gets the crucial evidence for his thesis about the postwar Korean community wrong by a factor of over 10x because he has relied on a single anonymous blog containing misinformation circulated via Wikipedia, without bothering to check it.

### 5.1.2 The Rise of the Communist Left

1. Ramseyer now tells us that ‘the communist refugees from Syngman Rhee’s South Korea soon took control over the most destitute and vulnerable of the Japanese-resident Koreans’. The next paragraph states that ‘almost immediately after the end of the war, communists commandeered the formal Korean organizations’, citing the name of Kim Chon-hae as his sole example. After some name changes, Ramseyer says, this group ‘eventually took the name Soren’ and ‘the violence began almost immediately’. He goes on to illustrate this with some lurid examples of ‘Korean violence’ between 1945 and 1950. These paragraphs demonstrate a lack of understanding of Korean political organizations in later 1940s-1950s Japan and a confused chronology of events. The dominant Korean organization in Japan between

1945 and 1949 (when it was forcibly dissolved by the Occupation authorities) was the League of Koreans (*Chōsenjin Renmei* or *Chōren*) – the body in which Kim Chon-hae was one of a number of prominent figures. It initially embraced a broad spectrum of political opinions, but became increasingly left-wing as time went on. Following its dissolution, from 1951 to 1955, the leading left-wing Korean organization was the Democratic Front for the Unification of Koreans in Japan (*Zainichi Chōsen Tōitsu Minshu Sensen* or *Minsen* for short), which was the only one of the groups discussed here to be very closely aligned with the Japanese Communist Party. Neither *Chōren* nor *Minsen* was dominated by postwar refugees from Jeju – the key figures had been in Japan since before the war. ‘Soren’, the only group Ramseyer actually names (properly *Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai* in Japanese, abbreviated to *Sōren*) was not founded until 1955, so obviously did not instigate any violence in the late 1940s or early 1950s (See Lie 2008, 39–41). Its founding mission was to separate the Korean community in Japan from the influence of the Japanese Communist Party, and to redirect Koreans’ loyalty to North Korea. It encouraged its members not to engage in revolutionary activity in Japan, but rather to focus on contributing to the rebuilding and strengthening of North Korea.

### 5.1.3 Out-Migration

1. Here we are told that ‘those Koreans who had learned to make their way within Japan (those already integrated into Japanese social capital networks) created a rival organization that in time would become the Mindan (Zai Nihon Daikan minkoku mindan)’, which ‘constituted a way-station along the path to full assimilation’. Apart from failing to make clear that *Mindan* was founded in 1948, seven years before *Sōren*, Ramseyer fails to note a few roadblocks to being ‘already integrated into Japanese social capital networks’ and on the path to ‘full assimilation’. Koreans in Japan had been Japanese nationals in the colonial period, and theoretically remained so until the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan in 1952. As its first act on achieving independence from occupation, the Japanese government unilaterally rescinded the Japanese nationality of Koreans in Japan, turning them into aliens with no guaranteed residence rights. As aliens, Koreans had no vote, were ineligible for any form of government employment – such as teaching in state schools or even sweeping the streets for their local council – and had no access to most forms of welfare (such as state pensions). Acquiring Japanese nationality by naturalization was legally possible, but in practice extremely difficult. Most large Japanese companies also refused to hire Koreans in white collar positions
2. The following paragraph, on assimilation, highlights the other fundamental and obvious flaw, referred to at the start of my comments. In this article: Ramseyer never defines what he means by a ‘Korean in Japan’. Is he talking about people with Korean citizenship, people with Korean ancestry, or people who identify in one way or another (and there are many possible ways) as Korean? He seems not to have grasped the fact that the Japanese government does not collect statistics on ethnic background or identity. There are no census questions on the ethnicity, and there are therefore no statistics on the number of people in Japan who have Korean heritage and/or identify as Zainichi Korean. Thus, while it is true that the

number of Korean nationals resident in Japan has declined because of intermarriage and naturalization (which has become easier over time), there is no way of telling how many of those with Japanese nationality but Korean heritage see themselves as Korean.

3. The statement that ‘violently hard-left political opportunists’ have become the face of those who continue to identify as Korean is completely wrong, and is easily disproved by the statistics on those Korean community that are available. Another crucial part of this story which Ramseyer fails to mention is that members of the long-term Korean resident community in Japan are required (for complex historical reasons) to register themselves with the Japanese authorities either as ‘*Zainichi Kankokujin*’ (using the name for ‘Korea’ adopted by the South Korean government) or as ‘*Zainichi Chōsenjin*’ (using the name for Korea which is incorporated into the official title of North Korea). Although these names are not precise indicators of political affiliation (*Zainichi Kankokujin* do not necessarily support the policies of the Korean government, and not all *Zainichi Chōsenjin* are pro-North Korean), they are a rough indicator of the political spectrum. As of 2018 (according to the Ministry of Justice source quoted by Ramseyer elsewhere in his article) amongst members of the long term *Zainichi* Korean community who retain their Korean nationality and are registered with the Japanese authorities, 292,878 (91%) choose to register as *Zainichi Kankokujin* (i.e. using the South Korea affiliated identifier) as opposed to 29,569 (9%) who are registered as *Zainichi Chōsenjin* (i.e. using the identifier often seen as being associated with North Korea). Those who belong to or are affiliated with *Sōren* are an even smaller proportion of the population.

#### 5.1.4 The Soren Schools

1. This section bases its discussion of the complex history of the Sōren school system on a single mass market book published by the right-wing Sankei Newspaper company, and wrongly referenced in the bibliography (see below).

### 5.2 Residual Dysfunction

#### 5.2.2 Dysfunction

1. Here Ramseyer returns to his theme of labelling Koreans in Japan ‘dysfunctional’, criminal, uneducated and lacking social capital. He provides a table to show that even in 2015, their crime rate was much higher than that of Japanese. This table is footnoted to Ministry of Justice statistics on ‘foreigners in Japan’ for 2018 and Police Agency crime statistics for 2015. Neither of these documents contains the data reproduced in this table. The Ministry of Justice reports provide population figures but no crime statistics, while the Police Agency statistics give figures for crimes committed by all Koreans in Japan (both ‘special permanent residents’ and ‘newcomers’), but do not distinguish between these two groups. Ramseyer’s table does distinguish between them, but the referencing gives no indication of the source of the additional information which is the basis for this distinction, so there is no way of confirming its accuracy.



2. Ramseyer tells us that Koreans in Japan are not only criminal but also welfare dependent, and produces a table to demonstrate this (Table 5). The first half of this table (up to 1957) is based on material from a publication by Higuchi Yūichi, a serious historian. The table then leaps to 2010 figures which are taken from a book entitled *The Special Privileges and Crimes of Koreans in Japan*, written Bandō Tadanobu, a far-right former police interpreter best known for his work in disseminating demeaning stereotypes of various minorities at home and abroad. Bandō's recent contributions to public discourse include an online video explaining to Japanese viewers that the US Black Lives Matter is a Black Supremacist movement whose members go around urging people to kill whites (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mf5xTeDr0jg>) On the basis of this expertise, Professor Ramseyer tells us that 'the fraction of Korean households on welfare could be twenty times the fraction for Japanese households' (sic).
3. The result (says Ramseyer) is a community of Koreans in Japan who are dysfunctional, devoid of social capital and talent, are manipulated by communist leaders and 'generate significant discrimination against themselves'. He offers no evidence for any of these gratuitous statements. On the contrary, serious studies done on this subject show that Zainichi Koreans with Korean nationality, despite decades of social challenges and discrimination, and despite ethnic prejudice evident even today, had, by the mid-1990s, reached a point where their average education levels were only very marginally lower than those of the Japanese majority, and where their average SSM occupational prestige score and average income were marginally higher than those of the majority (Kim 2011, 240).

### 5.2.3 Repatriation

1. Like the rest of this article, this section demonstrates that the author has either failed to read the relevant literature or has deliberately chosen to ignore most of the facts and cherry pick a convenient few from works like a book by the right wing *Sankei Shinbun* (astonishingly listed in the bibliography as being authored by 'Shimbun, S' – the equivalent of listing a book produced by the Washington Post as being authored by 'Post, W'). Ramseyer omits any account of the complex social factors that pushed Zainichi Koreans to seek repatriation, or of the complex history of political maneuvers by the Japanese, North Korean, South Korean Soviet and other states which created the tragedy of the repatriation (see Takasaki and Pak 2005; Morris-Suzuki 2007).

### Bibliography

At my count, the bibliography contains at least ten misspellings, mis-transliterations etc.

### GENERAL COMMENTS

The fact that this article could have been published in a peer reviewed journal, despite its glaring scholarly flaws and use of offensive and demeaning language, is an indictment of the peer review system as it exists in scholarly publishing today. This seems to reflect two problems:

- (i) Academia / academic publishing has become divided into disciplinary silos which do not have enough communication with one another, apparently resulting (in this case) in an article not having been reviewed by scholars with expertise in crucial parts of its content.
- (ii) Academics (including those who serve of editorial boards) are under huge pressure from their home institutions to publish in peer reviewed journals and to perform a multitude of tasks. This means that more and more articles are being submitted for review, while academics have less and less time and incentive to review these articles thoroughly.

The deeply regrettable publication of this article has one positive side to it: this is a wake-up call, confronting scholars and academic publishers with the urgent need to get together to discuss how we can improve and rethink methods of maintain and strengthening scholarly integrity in the dissemination of knowledge, and ensure that something like this never happens again.

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